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UK	investment	fund	for	high-growth	firms	is	a	step	in
the	right	direction
Support	packages	for	innovative	firms	are	emerging	as	second-wave	policy	tools	during	the	Covid-19	crisis.
Following	similar	efforts	in	France	and	Germany,	the	UK	government	unveiled	a	£1B	support	package	for	start-ups,
scale-ups,	and	research	and	development	firms	on	20	April,	after	having	launched	its	main	business	support
programs	in	March.
The	new	UK	support	package	includes	a	novel	£250M	investment	fund,	called	the	Future	Fund,	targeting	unlisted
high-growth	firms,	specifically	those	that	have	raised	at	least	£250K	from	third-party	investors	in	the	past	five	years.
Through	the	Future	Fund	the	government	will	buy	convertible	notes	issued	by	the	firms	to	make	investments	that
are	50-50	matched	by	the	private	sector.	Under	the	minimum	terms	set	out	by	the	government,	unpaid	notes	will
automatically	convert	into	equity	at	a	20%	discount	on	the	most	recent	round	price	at	the	point	of	conversion.
What	will	the	impact	of	the	Future	Fund	be?	Aside	from	anecdotal	evidence	from	a	few	well-known	examples,	such
as	the	Yozma	programme	in	Israel,	evidence	for	the	success	of	private	equity	government	interventions	is	still
sparse.	This	is	in	large	part	due	to	difficulties	in	constructing	meaningful	counterfactual	scenarios:	What	would	have
been	the	performance	of	firms	absent	the	interventions?
The	evidence	from	my	recent	research	with	Daniel	Paravisini	provides	novel	insights	for	the	Future	Fund.	In	this
paper,	we	measure	the	effects	of	the	Seed	Enterprise	Investment	Scheme	(SEIS),	the	UK	flagship	programme	to
incentivise	equity	investments	by	individual	investors	in	high-growth	firms.	To	construct	meaningful	counterfactuals,
we	exploit	exogenous	variation	in	participation	from	the	program’s	firm-size	unexpected	eligibility	threshold	during
its	launch	in	2012.
SEIS	is	a	matching	scheme	that	offers	investors	in	unlisted	firms	a	£1	tax	rebate	for	every	£2	invested,	among	other
tax	benefits.	Its	distinguishing	feature	is	that	eligibility	is	restricted	to	individual,	third-party,	non-controlling	investors
that	buy	ordinary	shares.	Perhaps	as	a	result	of	this	restriction,	SEIS	take-up	relative	to	the	eligible	population	is
small:	only	a	minor	proportion	of	small	businesses	ever	raise	equity	finance	from	third-party	investors	(2%).
However,	SEIS	and	similar	tax	incentives	are	quite	popular	among	UK	high-growth	companies:	since	2012,	these
incentives	subsidised	more	than	30%	of	equity	investment	into	these	firms.
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Our	research	results	show	that	SEIS	causes	dramatic	growth	in	some	financially	constrained	start-ups	that
otherwise	would	not	have	occurred.	The	subsidised	equity	enabled	these	firms	to	raise	seven	times	as	much
funding	in	debt,	partly	from	the	same	equity	investors.	Why	do	investors	complement	their	subsidised	equity
investments	with	debt	such	as	convertible	notes?	Because	debt	allows	them	to	force	liquidation,	seize	assets,	and
replace	management	upon	default.	Without	these	contingent	control	rights,	the	risk	for	minority	investors	is	that
their	remaining	capital	at	risk	(the	part	that	was	not	matched	by	the	government)	will	be	held	up	in	“zombie”	start-
ups	that	do	not	grow	but	also	refuse	to	die.
These	results	constitute	the	first	evidence	that	control	rights	matter	for	business	angels.	They	also	show	that	in
settings	where	governments	subsidise	non-controlling	common	equity	investments,	like	in	the	UK,	business	angel
investors	can	implement	control	rights	by	buying	debt	securities	alongside	common	shares.
Our	research	results	offer	two	main	lessons	for	the	Future	Fund.	First,	we	show	that	subsidising	third-party
investment	leads	to	high	start-up	growth	that	otherwise	would	not	occur.	Restricting	Future	Fund	eligibility	to	firms
that	have	already	secured	third-party	investment	will	help	the	government	hone	in	the	right	set	of	businesses	for	the
scheme:	those	with	high-growth	potential,	and	that	are	otherwise	hard	to	identify	in	the	population	of	businesses.
However,	the	Future	Fund	is	not	currently	compatible	with	private	equity	tax	incentives	like	SEIS.	Our	results	imply
that	this	incompatibility	can	lead	to	Future	Fund	underutilisation	because	participants	may	not	be	able	to	find
investors	that	are	willing	to	forgo	the	private	equity	tax	incentives	to	provide	the	private	sector	match	funding	for	the
Future	Fund.
Second,	our	results	point	to	the	prevalence	of	debt	contracts	in	the	UK	early-stage	firms	funded	through	SEIS.
Existing	debt	investors	in	these	firms	can	be	hard	pressed	to	consent	to	the	subordination	of	their	securities	to	the
government	notes,	because	these	notes	specify	a	100%	premium	repayment	—	meaning	that	firms	will	have	to	pay
twice	what	they	borrowed,	plus	8%	interest,	to	avoid	conversion.	The	implication	is	that	the	implementation	of
Future	Fund	investments	can	be	complex	for	these	companies	(and	those	funded	with	similar	tax	incentives),	which
can	lead	to	further	underutilisation.
While	this	premium	charged	by	the	government	will	make	it	more	likely	for	it	to	capture	some	of	the	upside	(and
thus	potentially	avoid	loss	of	taxpayers’	money),	it	can	undermine	take-up.	After	the	crisis,	most	potential
beneficiaries	will	not	expect	to	have	enough	cash	to	meet	the	premium.	However,	many	would	prefer	to	avoid
conversion,	because	the	Future	Fund	allows	the	government	to	sell	the	shares	to	institutional	investors	with	few
restrictions.	The	risk	for	start-ups	is	that	the	government	offloads	their	shares	to	funds	with	interests	in	competitors,
leading	to	conflicts	of	interest	and	potential	negative	value	effects.
In	conclusion,	the	Future	Fund	is	a	step	in	the	right	direction	to	help	private	equity	cope	amid	the	Covid-19
pandemic.	However,	its	current	design	may	undermine	demand.	To	increase	take-up,	the	government	could	make	it
compatible	with	SEIS	(and	other	tax	incentives),	lower	the	premium,	and	cede	transfer	rights	to	start-ups.	However,
the	optimal	design	should	trade	off	the	benefits	from	increased	take-up	against	the	potential	long-term	costs	to
taxpayers	from	streamlining	the	fund.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	How	Sensitive	is	Young	Firm	Investment	to	the	Cost	of	Outside	Equity?	Evidence
from	a	UK	Tax	Relief.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	the	CBI,	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London
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